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ABSTRACT The British conquest of parts of Africa in the nineteenth century has attracted
a lot of studies. Yet. all scholars involved hold different views especially as to the role of the
indigenous African groups in it. There are those who opined that the Africans who resisted
the British were patriotic in spite of the futility of their actions. and the Africans who sup-
ported the British are portrayed as collaborators or saboteurs that facilitated imperialism.
Other scholars are however of the opinion that those who took sides with the British were
not necessarily collaborators or unpatriotic elements but that they merely reacted to the
circumstances of the time.
Therefore, it is the contention of this paper that the ideas of collaboration or resistance in
African history are less relevant because the two groups \\-ere concerned mainly with the
protection of their socio-political and economic interests. The 1897 British conquest of
Nupcland, which is situated in the central part of the present day Nigeria, provides a good
example of the argument above. While the members of the Fulani ruling class of Bida dynasty
organized a strong force to resist the British in order to maintain their own political and
economic interest, significant sections of their subjects took sides with the British for similar
reasons. The northeast Yoruba. the Kyadya and the Yissazhi gave their moral and material
support to the British with the hope of bringing Bida domination to an end. It never mattered
to them whether the British were imperialists or not. Their target was to get rid of the Fulani
ruling dynasty.
Despite the stiff resistance by Bida army led by the members of the Fulani ruling class. it
was overwhelmed not by the superior weaponry of the British but by the massive support
given to the British by the interest groups who were expected to be on the sides of Bida. At
the end of the war. these groups were handsomely rewarded even though short-lived.
Key Words: Collaborators; Resistance: Imperialism: Interest groups; Bida: Fulani.
INTRODUCTION
In the various studies of African reaction to European conquests. there exist two
schools of thought concerning the role of different indigenous interest groups. The
first school is of the view that the Africans that cooperated with the Europeans against
their traditional authorities or rivals. as the case might have been. were not essentially
collaborators. For example, Obaro Ikime is of the opinion that though those Africans
who sided with the Europeans facilitated colonialism. "it is important to appreciate
the fact that they did not necessarily see themselves as saboteurs of collaborators ...
such groups or individuals were merely seeking to use the British as allies for the pro-
motion of their own interests" (lkime. 1977: 211). Similarly, Roland Oliver and J. D.
Fage opined that the categorization of such Africans as saboteurs or collaborators
"hardly fit the circumstances of eighty years ago" (Oliver & Fage. 1970: 49).
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The second school of thought. however, views European factor in Africa with
contempt. Scholars \vho belong to this group argue that those Africans who sided
with Europeans were nothing but saboteurs, traitors. quislings and unpatriotic
elements that aided colonialism. Agueta Pallinder who shares this view has bitterly
dismissed Obara lkimc's submission as "unhistorical and unnecessary apologies for
those who fell short of patriotic ideas" (Pallinder, 1978: 468).
The difference between the two schools of thought is clear. The first school believes
that those Africans who sided with the Europeans were merely reacting to the pre-
vailing circumstances of inter and intra-group rivalries in which the weak groups
tried to usc the European factor to achieve their aims. On the other hand, the second
school sees the interest groups as collaborators who aided imperialism not only by
supporting the Europeans but also by refusing to fight alongside with the resisting
African leaders. However. we arc of the opinion that the ideas of collaborators or
resisters in African history arc less relevant because both groups were concerned
primarily with the protection of their interests. Neither the collaborators nor the
resisters realized the over-all imperialistic designs of the Europeans.
It is acknowledged that the theme of African reaction to European conquest has
received a lot of attention from historians and undergone several reinterpretations.
However. the episode in Nupeland which presents a clear situation where indigenous
interest groups sided with the British against their leaders. has not been studied.
The British conquest in 1897 of Bida. the largest and the most prosperous of the nine-
teenth century middle Niger Basin emirates of Sokoto, was made possible. to a great
extent. by the roles played by three major interest groups. It is out of place to de-
scribe these groups as collaborators. Therefore, this paper examines the motives of
their actions, their roles in the conquest, and highlights their achievements there-
after. The three interest groups involved were the northeast Yoruba. a non-Nupe
speaking district of the emirate; the Kyadya. a small but powerful riverine Nupe
subgroup; and the Yissazhi. descendant of the pre-Fulani Nupe ruling dynasty.
BIDA EMIRATE BEFORE THE BRITISH CONQUEST
As we are aware, the emergence of Bida emirate was a consequence of the nineteen-
th century Sokoto Jihad (Mason, 1970). The scheming and execution of the plan to
overthrow the ruling Nupe dynasty during the period was spearheaded by MaIJam
Dendo, a Fulani itinerant preacher. His descendants founded Bida emirate in 1857
after failing to achieve such a feat at Raba earlier in the I830s. However. apart from
Bida, there were other emirates in Nupe such as Agaie, Lapai, Lafiagi and Shonga.
Under the Sokoto Caliphate system, these emirates were placed under the supervision
of Gwandu (Balogun, 1970). Of the five Nupe emirates. Bida was by far the largest
and most populous. Its territory covered areas far beyond Nupeland across the Niger
to the northeast Yorubaland, Alclllai in the present Bendel State and Akoko in Ondo
State. Economically too, Bida was obviously the most prosperous. since taxes and
tributes in cash and kind from its numerous dependencies enriched its treasury. The
vastness of Bida's areas of jurisdiction and strong revenue base reduced other Nupe
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emirates to the position of "pocket emirates" in the scheme of things or the caliphate
system. They had to send their tributes to Gwandu through the Emirs of Bida.
Owing to the divergent cultural and language composition of the emirate. Bida
adopted a complete administrative structure aimed at ensuring loyalty to the centre.
The capital and its immediate environs were put directly under the supervision of the
Emir himself. He often toured these areas. In the second category, Nupe speaking
areas which were very far from the capital, such as Eggan and Lokoja. were placed
under the royal delegates called Egbazhi. (Cl The Egbazhi exercised power and au-
thority in their districts on behalf of the Emir. The third category were those areas
where the inhabitants' economic pursuits and their general way of lifc presented
different features. Such areas were the northeast Yorubaland and the Kyadya. The
indigenous political system here were retained but the appointmcnts and installations
of thcir political heads were subject to Bida's approval.
This kind of administrative system adopted by Bida was unique in the Sokoto
Caliphate system. Apart from the extensive nature of the emirate, it was. unlike other
emirates. not contiguous. as rivers Niger and Kaduna cut across its length and
breadth. In addition to these. the emirate encompassed multi-ethnic and cultural
groups. Though Nupe group appearcd predominant, there were such groups as the
Kakanda, the Oworo. the Kupa, the Yagba, the Owe and the Afemai. Each of these
groups were politically independent before they were conquered or absorbed into
Bida emirate system. Therefore, for the purpose of stability and continuous loyalty,
it was imperative that Bida retained the existing indigenous political systems in these
areas.
However. despite the apparent sagacious steps Bida took in the administration
of the districts. resistance movements against it did not cease. There were many up-
risings organized by the indigenous groups to throw ofT the yoke of what they con-
sidered as "alien" rule. Benveen 1868 and 1882. Bida had to contend with three great
rebellions. First was the Kwenti war of 1868 against Emir Masaba (r. 1859-73) by
the inhabitants of Lavun district on the banks of river Kaduna (ldrees. 1982). Second-
ly. there was the Fogbagba war of 1876 led against Bida by Prince Baba. a descendant
of Etsu Majiya. one of the ousted factions of the Nupe ruling dynasty. Thirdly. there
was the Kyadya rebellion of 1881-82 which culminated in the Ganigan War (ldrees.
1986).
Though threatening these uprisings were, Bida was able to control them and re-
tained its suzerainty over the territories. A number of reasons may help to explain
this. Since coming into contact with European merchants on the Niger during the
second half of nineteenth century, Bida maintained the monopoly of acquisition of
fire arms and amunitions (Mason, 1970). With this. it was able to equip its highly
mobile section of the army. the cavalry. with European weaponry. Bida's cavalry be-
came almost invincible. This was used not only to suppress rebellions but also to
expand Bida'5 territories and raid for slaves that formed an essential part of its
economy. Secondly, the experience of severe repression of the Kyadya revolt during
1881-82 was enough a deterrent to other would-be rebels. Hundreds of Kyadya
settlements were razed. their canoes upon which they depended for their livelihood
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were either destroyed or seized. their leaders were publicly executed at Bida and many
of the Kyadya soldiers were carted away as slaves (Jdrees, 1986). After the Kyadya
revolt. except for the Owe protest against children levy of 1896. l3ida did not experi-
ence any other major rebellion from its districts until the British conquest of 1897.
However. one thing was certain: notwithstanding the coercive nature of Bida's
administration over the dissatisfied groups. hatred and disaffection for Bida persisted.
There was general discontent against Bida amongst the northeast Yoruba not only
because it imposed alien rule overthem but also due to the exploitative and unpopular
nature of its administrative policies. They thus awaited an opportunity by which to
eliminate what can be considered as authoritarian administration. The Kyadya and
the Yissazhi continued to see Bida as a historic enemy that had encroached upon
their territories and subjugated them. While the Kyadya desired to break off the
bonds of Bida domination. the Yissazhi wanted to regain its privileged position of
ruling Nupeland. a position they had lost to the Fulani rulcrs of Bida and othcr
Nupe emirates.
To understand the above, it would be necessary to explain the genesis of the strained
relationship between Bida and the three indigenous groups in question. By so doing.
we will be able to see the background of these groups' siding with thc British against
Bida in 1897.
SEEDS OF DISCORD
from available evidcnce. the picture of Bida's policy in the northeast Yorubaland
is that of unprecedented depredations. Long before the establishment of Bida cmiratc
in 1897, Fulani-Ied Nupe armies had consistently raided the northeast Yorubaland.
From Raba. Dendo's soldiers campaigned into Oweland for slaves and tributes
(l3ida. 1950). Similarly. when Masaba rebelled against his brothers and established
himself as an independent sovereign at Lade in the 1830s. he raidcd Yorubaland also
for slaves and tributes to sustain his administration (Bida. 1950). By the time the
nascent Bida emirate, being created in 1857. had thus consolidated, more regular
raiding activities into the northeast Yorubaland were resumed by the offspring of
Dendo at Bida until the area was subjugated. The importancc of this district to the
economy of Bida, especially in terms of human resources, cannot be overemphasized.
This was responsible for the eventual extension of the emiratc's jurisdiction to this
region.
Undoubtedly. the slave raiding activities of the Fulani-led Nupe armies created a
lot of problems for the northeast Yoruba. Depopulation, relocation of settlements
to barren and hilly terrains and disrruption of indigenous industries arc but a few
examples of the effects of the Fulani-Ied Nupe activities in the area (Obayemi. 1978).
But the subsequent administrative policies of Bida over the northeast Yorubaland
created much more problems that made it very unpopular up till the 1897 British en-
counter. At the beginning. Bida authorities replaced the mini-state systems that
proliferated in the area by a very highly eentralized political set up. This system was
alien to the people who had lived in clusters of independent political units and re-
Collaboration and R.:sistancc: British Conquest in Nigeria 73
publics over centuries. It appears that Bida was more concerned about the economic
potentials of the area which it sought to exploit. To achieve this end. therefore. there
was a need to bring together all the independent mini-states spread over the extensive
territory under effective administration.
From indications. Bida was not short of manpower with which to administer the
northeast Yorubaland but it decided to upgrade the Obaro(3) chieftaincy of the Owe
(Kabba) to the status of paramount chief over all the distinct and independent com-
munities of the northeast Yorubaland (Apata, 1985). The Obara was thus to imple-
ment the policies of Bida in the area under the supervision of the royal official delegate
at Lokoja. Among his functions was to collect tributes for onward transmission to
Bida.
The imposition of the Obara was a political misadventure for Bida. It was not only
the non-Owe groups of Ogidi. Gbedde. Yagba. Akoko and others that resented this
but even some Owe clans who abhorred the transformation of their highly democratic
institution into an absolutist monarchy propped up by an cxternal aggressor. Perhaps
if Bida had appointed ollicial delegates to all the mini-states in the area and made
them directly responsible to the Emir, the situation could have been different. We
have no evidcnce to show why Bida decided otherwise. However, one may suggest
that language and cultural differences must have been responsible for Billa's line of
action. While Bida's officials were Nupes and Hausa of Islamic culture. the north-
east Yorubas observed traditional religion.
In addition to the political centralization, evidence of Bida's misrule in thc area
abounds. For example. the excesses of Bida reached the climax whcn it demanded
tributes in boys and girls from only the northeast Yoruba out of all its numerous
districts. In 1895. the people protested against this to no avail. Latcr in the year,
they complained of this to the British government in Lagos through Capitan Bower.
the British Resident at Ibadan (Perham & Bull. 1963). As soon as Bida got wind of
the overtures of the northeast Yoruba with the British. it despatched the strongest
detachmcnt of its army, the cavalry, under the command of heir apparent. Prince
Muhammad Makun to camp at Ogidi ostensibly to nip in the bud any possible re-
bellion (Obayemi, 1978). Even though the rebellion did not occur. the long occupa-
tion of the area by Bida army must have had adverse socioeconomic efTects on the
area. By thc occupation. the freedom of movement of the people was impeded, a situa-
tion that could not have allowed for full economic pursuits and interaction of the
people to exchange ideas. Secondly, during the occupation. the Bida army might have
fed on the food products of the inhabitants thereby depleting their reserves.
However, it should be understood that Bida had not committed such a great num-
ber of its soldiers and nobility into this campaign only to suppress a non-violent revolt
in the area. Other political and economic factors. very important to Bida's policy
towards northeast Yorubaland. wcre responsible. As we are aware. the area had
served as the main source of slaves and tributes for a long time. By thc time slave
trade was abolished. the members of Bida ruling class that had benefitted from it
diverted the object of their investment to large scale agricultural production. Ex-
tensive plantations established around Bida to produce cotton. groulldlluts and
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grains required large and cheap labour force. Hence. if the subjects of Bida in north-
east Yorubaland decided to halt the supply of human tributes and resist slave raids.
the economic base of the ruling elite would be adversely affected. It was not surprising,
therefore, that the nobility class was involved in the campaign. The second factor had
to do with political instability at Bida. the seat of the cmirate government itself:
The northeast troubles coincided with thc installation of Emir Abubakar (1895-
1901). It is evident that Abubakar was installed amidst objections from several popular
princes and Ulema, and hence he had it tough consolidating his authority (Apata,
1985). It was therefore politically expedient for him to get rid of the rival princes
temporarily or otherwise. by ordering them to join in the military campaign. In a
nutshell, before the advent of the British. the northeast Yoruba viewed Bida policies
in their area as inhuman, high-handed and inconsiderate. Though they did not em-
bark on any serious resistance. which might have been due to their weak military
position. they did not fail to show their discontent at Bida policies as exemplified in
their protest to Ibadan.
The second interest group to be examined is the Kyadya. a riverine section of
Nupeland. Of the various groups that opposed the establishment of emirate systems
in Nupeland, the Kyadya gave the strongest challenge. As it was the case with the
northcast Yoruba. economic and political issues formed the bone of contention
between Bida and the Kyadya.
Until the emergence of Bida emirate. the Kyadya had enjoyed a large measure of
autonomy arising not only from the peculiar nature of their habits but also from the
specialized economic activities they pursued (fdrees. 1986). They constituted a distinct
territorial and cultural unit whose means of livelihood depended on the resources of
rivers Niger and Kaduna. The Kyadya specialized in piscatorial. canoe-ferrying and
other water craft skills thereby putting trade and traffic on these rivers under effective
control. Over a period of time, they evolved a highly centralized political system under
the leadership of Kuta to manage and regulate the riverine economic activities. The
Kyadya had jealously guarded the independence of their system even during the Pre-
Jihad times of central Nupe administration (ldrees, 1985).
With the foundation of Bida emirate in 1857. the position of the Kyadya became
threatened. For economic and political reasons, Bida authorities could not accept
the situation whereby the riverine inhabitants would remain autonomous within the
emirate system as it had been the case during the Pre-Jihad limes. The Kyadya oc-
cupied strategically significant areas of Nupeland. Therefore they were in the posi-
tion to aid any of the indigenolls resislant groups which had by then not laid down
their arms. Thus, the only alternative for the nascent emirate government was to in-
corporate the entire riverine area. Secondly. soon after its establishment. Biela em-
barked on lerritorial expansion. Having subdued \vith ease the immediate surround-
ing Nupe and Gbagyi (Gwari) settlements. it was attracted to areas across the Niger
such as Lokoja, Oworo, Ebirra (Igbirra) and the northeast Yoruba for the prospects
of slaves and tributes.
However, the only access and means of transport to such areas were in the hands
of the Kyaclya. Going by the Kyadya's strictly commercial oriented canoe-ferrying
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service. all passengers and goods crossing the rivers Niger and Kaduna must be
charged some fees and tolls (ldrees, 1985). Had Bida condoned these situations, its
territorial aggrandizement and economic interests would have been jeopardized. At
that period. Bida required free access to the slave markets on the Lagos Coast to
dispose of their captives and to acquire firearms and ammunition (Mason. 1976).
Even though Bida was not prepared to tolerate an all-powerful Kyadya within its
jurisdiction at that time. it had no wherewithal to subjugate them. As the result, Bida
had to resort to the use of diplomacy. During the reign of Emir Masaba (1859-73),
Bida tried to weaken the Kyadya political system by supporting the enthronement of
a pro-Bida Kyadya Prince Zhiri as the Kuta(~) (Idrees. 1985). Hence. until he died in
1874. Kuta Zhiri used his position to favour Bida and perpetrate its influence on the
Kyadya. For example. canoe-ferrying services were rendered free of charge to Bida.
In addition to that. the Kyadya capital was shifted from Muregi. its traditional base.
to Dokomba. a town not very far from Bida. But as soon as Kuta Zhiri died. the
Kyadya reasserted their independence and resisted attempts by Emir Umaru Majigi
(1873-82) to influence the appointment of another pro-Bida Kyadya Prince as the
Kuta.
During his reign, the relationship between Bida and the Kyadya soured into
hostility. Apparently. Umaru Majigi lacked the patience and diplomacy of Emir
Masaba and was eager to subdue the Kyadya. The hostility between them thus cli-
maxed into a war in 1881-82 called Ganigan war (Idrees. 1986). Because of the
determination of the Kyadya to resist Bida's encroachment and the advantages of
their naval power over Bida army. it took the alliance of European merchants and
Bida with their sophisticated gunboats and cavalry many months to overpower the
Kyadya forces. It was at the end of this war that the Kyadya lost their most cherished
control of rivers Niger and Kaduna.
The consequences of the Ganigan war were so devastating that until the British
conquest of Bida, the Kyadya remained dissatisfied and disorganized. Kuta Usuman.
who had become the embodiment of Kyadya resistance during this crisis. and his
indefatigable army commander. Kologba. were publicly executed at Bida for their
roles in the war. In their stead were appointed pro-Bida officials to manage the affairs
of the Kyadya on behalf of the Emir at Bida. Consequently. canoe-ferrying and
fishing activities were henceforth controlled by Bida through their proteges. Those
Kyadya Princes and other notables who detested the new social order went into exile
in Lokoja. Many other Kyadya soldiers escaped across the Niger and constituted
bands of highway robbers notoriously known as the Ganigans.
The Yissazhi. one of the factions of the Pre-Jihad Nupe ruling dynasty. also had a
bone to pick with Bida. The grievance of this group against Bida had its roots in the
Fulani taking over of power in the early part of the nineteenth century. The struggle
for succession to the throne of the Central EtSI/(5) Nupe between two cousins, Majiya
and Jimada. in 1805 had split the dynasty into two warring factions. While Majiya
Jed the Gwagbazhi, Jimada was at the head of the Yissazhi or the Agabizhi. This
division facilitated the intervention of the Fulani adventures under the leadership of
Mallam Dendo. Subsequently the overthrow of the Nupe dynasty was effected by
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the Dendo-Ied Fulani adventures. a situation that pushed both the Yissazhi and the
Gwagbazhi into the shadows.
Although several attempts were made by the two Nupe factions to displace the
Fulani, they were handicapped by a number of factors. The two factions did not
reconcile in order to present a formidable and united force against a common enemy,
the Fulani. Secondly. even if they had come together. it would have been impossiblc
for them to throw off the Fulani who had already sought and received the blessings
of Sokoto and Gwandu, headquarters of the Jihad movement. The Fulani in Nupe-
land only needed to ask for military support and Gwandu in particular. under whose
jurisdiction Nupeland fell in the caliphate system. would readily supply them. Thirdly,
knowing fully well that the two Nupe factions had no plan for reconciliation. the
Fulani employcd divide and rule tactics to further disunite them. This alone was
enough to keep the rival factions apart.
Of the two factions. Gwagbazhi suffered untold hardships in the hands of the
Fulani for their consistent attempts to dislodge the "alien" new rulers (Fulani). For
this reason. the group and the remnants of its supporters were pushed into an obscure
region in Zugurma. far removed from Nupeland. On the other hand. the Yissazhi.
which gave the Fulani less trouble. was tolerated so long as they would not claim any
right to the rulership of Nupeland.
Though not contended with their new position, the Yissazhi had no other option.
They had to participate in various wars the Fulani waged to consolidate. especially
those against thc Gwagbazhi. Perhaps the most important support from the Yissazhi
to the Fulani was in the suppression of Vmar Bahaushc's rcvolt that culminated in
the foundation of Bida as the new Fulani capital in ccntral Nupeland in 1857
(Dupigny. 1970).
From indication, the Yissazhi had supported the Fulani with the hope of a certain
political and territorial reward. Perhaps, they had learnt that the only way out was
to cooperate with the Fulani knowing the fate of the Gwagbazhi who tried to use
force. However, the Yissazhi underscored the fact that the Fulani were in Nupeland
to carve out for themselves independent political units. The Fulani were not prepared
to allow the Yissazhi rule over any part of Nupeland as Etsu Nupe. Hence the leader
of the Yissazhi. Muazu Yissa. and his family quartered in Bida along with the Fulani.
Although he was allowed to hold on to his ancestor's title of Etsu Nupe. this was
without the appurtenances of office (ldrees, 1982). He became a leader whose subjects
(if any) or sympathisers pay homage to in secret. His movements were watched and
restricted to his farm. In a nutshell. the leaders of Yissazhi became more or less
hostages in Bida with all hopes to rcgain their privileged position lost.
The thrce cases presented in the preceding paragraphs represent the general state of
affairs in Bida emirate before the British onslaught of 1897. The policies of Bida
towards the interest groups had created so many internal enemies that it could hardly
rely on these groups in the event of any external aggression on the Emirate. Bida had
done all it could to sustain its political and economic goals hut this had not gone well
with various components of the Emirate that had beeen coerced to abandon their
claims of self-determination. The disaffection for Bida by the three groups did not
manifest because of the coercion, militarist policies and high-handedness employed
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to subdue the people as earlier explained. The advent of the British, therefore, pro-
vided the desired opportunity during which the interest groups openly expressed their
dissatisfaction for Bida policies.
BRITISH CONQUEST AND THE ROLES OF THE INTEREST GROUPS
Until the 1890s, the relationship that existed between Bida authorities and various
European merchants on the banks of the Niger, particularly the British traders, was
cordial. Bida derived a lot of material benefits as revenue in terms of taxes and tools
from the merchants. Perhaps the greatest advantage to Bida was the regular supply
of fire arms and ammunition which enhanced its military strength among the middle
Niger Basin emirates of Sokoto Caliphate. During the violent Kyadya rebellion of
1881-82 against Bida, the European merchants supplied gunboats, the Flila/r, the
Gando and the Nllpe in support of Bida to suppress it (Idrees. 1985). In addition to
all these, Bida's ruling class also benefitted from the large scale trading activities with
the foreign merchants. For example. Emir Maliki (1882-95) acquired enormous
wealth from the profits of his trading activities with the foreigners (Adeleye. 1971).
The cordial relationship based on the spirit of give and take changed into hostility
arising from what Bida might have considered over-ambitious and unwarranted
designs of the British merchants. The root cause of this break down in relationship
lay mainly in the desire of the British merchants to monopolize the middle Niger
enterprise by climinating other European merchants (Adeleye. 1971). Biela authorities
did not favour the exit of the French and the German merchants ostensibly because
of the material bencfits derived from them. On the other hand, thc British was more
detcrmined to leave no stone unturned in acquiring the monopoly. With the backing
of London and the Emir of Gwandu, Bida's overlord. the British went ahead to
achieve their aim. This development generated tensions between Bida and the British
that culminated in the war of 1897. The monopoly issue may have been a catalyst
for the British desire to acquire Sokoto Caliphate as part of their imperial possessions.
It is well known that the British had been contesting some territories in Nigerian re-
gion with the French and the Germans since the 1886-87 European partition of
African Conference.
On the 6th of January. 1897. the Royal Niger Company (RNC) Force compris-
ing thirty European officers and five hundred and thirteen African rank and file left
Lokoja for Ogidi via Kabba town (Perham & Bull, 1963). This manoeuvre was in-
tended to route Bida army which had encamped there since 1896. However. by the
time the Company Force got there. the army had vacated the camp. The news of an
impending war must have been responsible for their departure.
The RNC Force had failed to hit Bida decisively as planned but succeeded in sever-
ing its most resourceful district. Notwithstanding its disappointment. the Company
Force returned to Kabba township and declared the northeast Yoruba's independcnce
of Dida hegemony. This singular action deprived Bida of its most important economic
source. Hencc, without making a war, the British began a gradual dismcmberment
of the Emirate. first with the Kabba declaration.
It is not clear whether the northeast Yoruba, especially the people of Kabba. were
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aware of the purpose of the Company Force's movement to Ogidi. If they were.
perhaps they might have been informed of the departure of Bida army. Therefore.
one cannot say categorically whether or not they rendered any support during that
manoeuvre. What we do know is the reaction of the people of Kabba in particular
over the declaration of self-determination. The Jubilant Kabba Owe immediately
set about to give necessary help to the Company Force on its way to Bida. Apart
from the gifts of food items. the Owe supplied porters and guides that led the soldiers
through bush paths to Kpatagbon. a port town on the west bank of the Niger (ldrees.
1985). Another source claims that a number of young men from Kabba had joined
the services of the Company Force as volunteers and arrived at Kpatagbon with
the Force.
The Kyadya on their part offered most invaluable material and moral support to
the British. The Kyadya being the inhabitants of the banks of the river and those
who handled the essential canoe-ferrying services were in a position to tilt the balance
of power towards any of the warring parties. Whichever side they supported, there-
fore. was bound to have an advantage over the other.
Unlike the Owe who voluntarily cooperated with the Bristih force. the Kyadya
were courted for help by William Wallace. the RNCs agent-general (Idrees. 1985).
Apart from the fact that the Company needed the Kyadya boats and canoe-men. it
also needed their cooperation to be able to get to Bida through the marshy riverine
areas. Wallace appears to be well informed of the sour relationship between the
Kyadya and Bida. This is because he directed his search for Kyadya supporters to
Lokoja where a self-exile Kyadya Prince, Yahaya Marike lived. It was this situation
he explained.
Since the execution of Kuta Usman at the end of the Kyadya rebellion of 1881-82.
Marike had become the leader of anti-Bida movement of the Kyadya in exile. He
commanded considerable respect throughout the Kyadya territory and wielded
enormous power and authority over the exiles that lived in Lokoja. This position
accorded him favourable barganing power with Wallace. With the promise of the
coveted title of the Kula and independence for the Kyadya. Marike mobilized his
followers at Lokoja and other Kyadya towns around in support of the RNC against
Bida. Under his instructions, the Kyadya inhabitants of Kpatagban cooperated with
the Company Force that had arrived from Kabba on its way to Bida. They also
refused to ferry the retreating Bida army across the Niger as expected of them. It had
to make a long and unpleasant journey to Kusogi during which many soldiers
either died or deserted (Dupigny, 1970). This deprived Bida of the much needed rein-
forcement in the course of the war. And following the Kpatagban experience and
acting on the orders of Marike, all the other Kyadya along the banks of the Niger
withdrew their services from Bida. They "manned their canoes. placcd them at the
disposal of the RNC and under the command of a gunboat, undertook to guard the
river so that no reinforcements should reach the beleagucred capital" (Nadel. 1942:
82).
At the time. Bida was gripped with fever of imminent British conquest, and when
it callcd for military aids from the neighbouring Lapai and Agaie emirates. the
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Yissazhi. living inside Bida township. refused to go to the battle. The then leader of
group, Idrisu Gana, merely retired to his farms with his family (Idrees. 1982). From
there he issued instructions to stay out of the war to his supporters and those \vho
had been paying him secret allegiance. Some of his riverine supporters withdrew their
canoes to Gbaradogi on the west bank to disallow Bida army from using them.
With the cooperation of the interest groups, the Company Force marched un-
challengcd from Kabba. on thc extreme end of thc west bank of the Nigcr to the walls
of Bida, the seat of the emirate government. The defence of Bida became the respon-
sibility of the Emir himself and the remnants of the army at home. The brave and
courageous military resistance Emir Abubakar put up was met with a formidable
Company Force that had all the vital moral and material support of the interest
groups.
The much needed reinforcement from the Makun-led Bida army did not arrive
because the Kyadya had demobilized it on the west bank of the Niger. The resistance
of the Emir was aimed at protesting the interests of the ruling class. HO\vever. the
interest groups sided with the Company Force to see to the elimination of Bida au-
thorities and the system they represented. By the time Bida authorities realized that
the northeast Yoruba. the Kyadya and the Yissazhi were not on their side. the Com-
pany Force had almost entered the city of Bida. External reinforcement that came
from Lapai and Agaie could not change the tide of the war. By the 27th of January,
1897, the Company Force under the command of Mr. William Wallace took Bida.
THE AFTERMATH: NEW DISPENSATION AND THE ACI-IIEVEMNT OF
THE INTEREST GROUPS
The victory of the RNC Force over Bida was more a victory for the interest groups.
Howcver. although the defeat of Bida meant the materialization of an age-long
ambition of the indigenous groups, their immediate concern was the realization of
self-determination. This may havc arisen from the fact that Bida ruling lineage, the
source of the groups dissatisfaction. was not after all cxpelled as they expected. The
Company's agent-general. William Wallace, simply deposed Emir Abubakar who
bad led Bida resistance. and replaced him by Prince Makun Muhammad. a senior
member of the lineage (Dupigny. 1970). There is no evidence to show that Wallace
intended to back out of the promises to its allies (indigenous groups) nor did he wish
to return the northeast Yoruba district to the new potentate. Emir Muhammad. The
anxiety of the interest groups should not be a surprise because the emirate system
under which they lost their independence was not abrogated. The retcntion of that
system which symbolized oppression was enough a source of threat to the indigcnous
groups that had openly supportcd the Company Force.
Howcvcr. one factor that seemed to have favoured the interest groups and strength-
ened their confidence in the Company was its (RNC) inability to set up a direct
administration over the conquered emirate. and yet wantcd Bida's suzerainty over
the extensive middle Niger Valley curtailed. This weakness on the part of thc Com-
pany may have been due to the shortage of suitablc manpower and lean financial
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resources at its disposal at that time. The deposed Emir Abubakar was later to ex-
ploit this situation to stage a successful comeback only to be re-deposed by Lugard
after the Company's second conquest of Bida in 1901.
Be that as it may. it was the indigenous interest groups-the allies of the Company-
that benefitted more from the prevailing post-conquest circumstances. The Com-
pany. being aware that Bida ruling elites might not stop raids into the northeast
Yoruba for economic reasons. otlicially abolished the Egbu(6l (delegate) system on
the westbank (Dupigny. 1970). As earlier pointed out. the Egba stationed at Lokoja
was the overseer of the non-N upe subjects of the emirate of the northeast Yoruba.
He was the sole authority of Bida in charge of all possessions on the westbank. The
abolition of this system marked the end of Bida's domination of not only the north-
east Yorubaland but all the erstwhile Bida's territorial possessions on the west bank.
As for the Kyadya. Prince Yahaya Marike. who had done so much in mobilizing
the Kyadya both at home and in exile for the Company's course. was brought from
Lokoja and installed as the Kula at Muregi in place of the pro-Bida Kula Jsatakun
(Tdrees, 1985). Under Kula Marike, the Kyadya were made independent of Rida, a
position they were before 1857. To spite Bida authorities further. both KUla Marike
and Emir Muhammed of Bida. an appointee of the Company. were presented similar
stafT of offices and accorded equal status in the scheme of things under the new dis-
pensation. Marike was latcr stripped of this privilege by Lugard in 1901 on the allega-
tion that he mismanaged taxes. Nevertheless. after the 1897 conquest. all vestiges of
Bida domination in the Kyadya territory were abrogated by the Company. For
example. taxes collected from the Kyadya were shared between the Company and the
KUla. and not to be sent to Bida as the case had been before the conquest. The control
of traffic and regulation of flshing activities were restored to the KUla. In this case.
it was not only the Kyadya that benefitted but the RNC's economic position was also
enhanced.
Pcrhaps the groups that gained more was the Yissazhi. Though the exercise of
power and authority over the whole of Nupeland. as desired by them was not
achievcd, the Company created an entirely new sphere of political influence for the
group. The Yissazhi under the leadership of Idrisu Gana were ferricd across the Niger
to the westbank to found Patigi emirate (Tdrees. 1982). After its establishment. Patigi
emiratc thus became a unique political unit in Nupeland which had a recognized
Emir that was not of Fulani descent but a survivor of the Nupe ruling dynasty of the
Pre-Jihad era. The Yissazhi thus resuscitated the EISll title which their ancestors
held, and revived all the Nupe traditional political offices.
Nevertheless. it is noteworthy that apart from rewarding the Yissazhi, Patigi emirate
served as a buffer zone bctween Bida and the othcr emirates of Lafiagi. Shonga and
Horin. The poor financial position in which the Company found itself after the con-
quest had prevented it from stationing a detachment of its soldiers at Bida city.
Hence Patigi emirate which would readily cooperate with the Company was strength-
ened to prevent any possible reinforcement to Bida from its three friendly emirates
of Lafiagi, Shonga and (Iorin. The company did not only cede part of Lafiagi terri-
tories to Patigi but also encouraged it to build lip an army comparable to any other
emirate's.
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The social order under which the interest groups had gained appreciable degree of
independence lasted from 1897 to 1901. Although the groups seemed satisfied with
their achievements. by the time the Company was taken over by the British imperial
government in London, the whole setup was overhauled in 1901 with Lugard's re-
conquest of Bida and his setting up of colonial administration (Dupigny, 1970). But
even with the colonial structure, Bida never gained back what it had lost to William
Wallace and his indigenous allies. For example. the northeast Yorubaland was never
made part of the Nupe province. Patigi emirate and its ruling dynasty remained. and
though the Kyadya were zoned into the new jurisdiction of Bida. they were allowed
to be administered by their KUla. This is to say. that no district head was appointed
from Bida for the Kyadya as it was the case with other Nupe districts that remained
with it such as Mokwa. Lemu and others.
CONCLUSION
The state of affairs in Bida emiratc bcfore the British conquest alicnated its au-
thorities from a number of indigenous groups. At different times the groups at-
tempted throwing off the yoke of Bida domination. This desire was a reaction to the
unpopular administrative and economic policies pursued by Bida. Though such
attempts were often met with scvere reprisals, it did not appear that the groups in-
volved relented in their efforts to overcome the prevailing unfavourable political.
economic and military control of Bida. Therefore, the desire of the British to subdue
Bida militarily provided the interest groups with the much needed opportunity to
achive their age-long goals. They did not see the British then as imperialists but useful
allies to be exploited to their own advantage. Their significant achievements shortly
after the conquest justify the groups' actions. Therefore. the indigenous interest
groups cannot be blamed for their pro-British action or for not knowing then that
they would only be exchanging one imperialist for another. The authorities of Bida
emirate also resistcd to protcct the samc interest as the indigcnous groups did.
NOTES
(1) A revised version of a paper presented at the Departmental Staff Seminar. History De-
partment. University of Horin, April 29, 1987.
(2) Egba::hi: These were the district governors of the pre-Fulani Nupe political organization.
(3) Obaro: The title of the indigenous ruler of the northeast Y oruba. He became a tool in the
hands of the Bida rulers throughout the period of Nupe domination of the area.
(4) KlIta: The title of the head of the Nupe riverine dwellers. They were independent until
the Flilani incursion into Nlipeland.
(5) Egba: (singular) District governor.
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